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RESTOCKING THE NAVAJO RESERVATION
AFTER BOSQUE REDONDO

JOHN 0. BAXTER

1869 A GROWING SENSE of excitement gripped
the Navajo people, spreading from hogan to hogan across their vast
reservation. As the November days shortened, large numbers of
Indians were on the move, drifting into the newly established tribal
agency at Fort Defiance, Arizona. By month's end, more than 7,000
Navajos had assembled near the dilapidated post and set up camp
along the sandy floor of Canon Bonito. Obviously the Dine, as the
Navajo called themselves, expected a momentous event. Under
terms of a recent treaty with the United States, the tribe had been
promised 15,000 sheep and goats as an incentive to peaceful pursuits and eventual self-sufficiency. Signed at Fort Sumner 1 June
1868, the same agreement had allowed the Dine to return home
after more than four years' confinement at Bosque Redondo. l
Delivery of the livestock was long overdue, but Indian skeptics
had been silenced a few. days earlier when the flock, tired and
dusty, trailed into the little fort after a long drive from eastern New
Mexico. As the sun rose on 29 November, the appointed day, a
wave of anticipation surged through the family groups warming
themselves around a thousand camp fires. At last, Agent Frank
Tracy Bennett, whom the Navajo had named "Big Belly," threw
open the gate of the big corral built for the occasion and ordered
the animals penned. It took five days for Bennett to distribute the
flock, but when he had finished, every man, woman, and child
went home with two sheep or goats. 2 Once again, the Dine had
become livestock owners and could look to the future with hope.
When Captain Bennett divided the treaty sheep in 1869, he gave
new life to an aspect of Navajo culture that was already more than
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two hundred years old. Since their acquisition from New Mexico's
Hispano colonists late in the seventeenth century, sheep had become much more than a useful economic resource or measure of
individual wealth. Among the Dine, stock raising gradually replaced hunting and agriculture as their primary means of subsistence. Of all the Indian peoples surrounding New Mexico only the
Navajos had made sheep a permanent part of their social structure. 3
Unlike the Blackfeet and other Plains Indians who have a tradition recalling how they originally obtained horses, the Navajos
retain no equivalent historical memory of their first sheep. Instead,
they depend on myth to explain this important event. Today many
Navajos would laugh at a suggestion that there was a time when
they did not have sheep to sustain them. 4 During the tribe's confinement at Bosque Redondo their flocks dWIndled to insignificance, which caused physical and spiritual hardship for the Dine.
Once the Navajo returned to their beloved homeland, sheep apportionment marked a cultural rebirth, a renewal of the Navajo
way of life.
Although Navajo sheep have a long heritage, outsiders seldom
call them handsome. The animals, first acquired through trade or
raids on neighboring Spaniards, were of the churro type, descendents of the stock brought north from New Spain by don Juan de
Onate and his followers in 1598. 5 Long legged and narrow bodied,
the churro was plain, but he soon adapted himself to the semiarid
environment of the Southwest. Somewhat meagre in quantity, his
long-fibred fleece was well suited to hand processing, and all agreed
that the churro's flesh was unsurpassed for flavor. 6
Navajos learned the techniques of spinning, dyeing, and weaving
from Pueblo Indian refugees fleeing Spanish oppression, but scholars disagree whether this occurred before or after the Pueblo Revolt
of 1680. By 1706, Navajo weavers not only supplied their people
with clothing and other textiles but also produced a marketable
surplus for trade' with Spaniards in times of peace. 7 As pastoralism
became more ingrained in Navajo culture, the people spread out
among the multi-colored canons and mesas of their homeland,
following the sheep in an unending search for fresh grass. 8 Eventually this need for pasture forced the tribe into a showdown fight
to protect the region that they loved so well.
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During the second half of the eighteenth century, Navajo relations with Hispano settlers on their eastern flank were marked by
intermittent conflict. As both sides contended for rangeland west
of the Rio Grande, they conducted retaliatory raids, stealing livestock, and seizing women and children who became slaves. Hostilities increased after 1800 when New Mexico's governor Fernando
Chacon granted a petition from thirty landless Albuquerque residents allowing them to establish a new community at Cebolleta,
an area that Navajos used for pasture. In the next sixty-five years
the Dine struggled valiantly to protect the integrity of their homeland, challenging Spanish, Mexican, and United States forces successively.9
When U. S. troops took over New Mexico in 1846, offiGials in
Washington knew little about the Indian tribes that ranged over
the newly conquered territory. Except for a few scattered facts in
the writings of traders and adventurers such as Josiah Gregg, information concerning Navajos was particularly scarce. Gregg had
des~ribed the tribe in the 1830s as a pastoral and agricultural people, numbering about 10,000, who cultivated a variety of crops and
tended enormous herds of livestock. Skillful raiders, they had seriously depleted New Mexico's sheep inventory and were openly
contemptuous of Mexican efforts to curb their depredations. 1.0 Between skirmishes, New Mexicans traded for Navajo blankets, which
Gregg greatly admired. Almost waterproof because of their close
weave, these textiles sometimes brought fifty dollars or more. Later
reports made by territorial officials after U. S. occupation failed to
add much solid data to Gregg's assessment. In 1846 New Mexico's
new governor Charles Bent estimated Navajo livestock holdings at
3',000 cattle, 10,000 horses and mules, and 500,000 sheep. Seven
years later tribal agent Henry L. Dodge, who was Closer to the
scene and better informed, cut the sheep numbers in half to 250,000.
No one really knew, least of all the Indians themselves. 11
Unfortunately, United States authorities had no more success
than their Spanish and Mexican predecessors in establishing a permanent peace with the Navajos. During the 1850s Indians and New
Mexicans continued the old pattern of retaliatory raids. Treaties
were signed only to be broken. Anxious to find a solution, New
Mexico's departmental commander Col. Edward R. S. Canby is-
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sued an ultimatum late in 1861: the Navajos must surrender for
resettlement in some remote location or face extermination. 12
A Confederate invasion of New Mexico early in the following
year delayed implementation of Canby's plans, but they were not
forgotten. Equally determined to resolve the Indian problem his
successor, Col. James H. Carleton, sent a force of New Mexico
Volunteers into the field with orders to give no quarter. Led by
Col. Christopher (Kit) Carson, the volunteers adopted a scorched
earth policy, driving into the heart of the Dine homeland where
they destroyed crops and decimated livestock. Carson's campaign
reached its climax with a sweep through Canon de Chelly in the
bitter cold of January 1864, which crushed Navajo resistance. As
harried tribal members began to surrender, they were packed off
to Bosque Redondo, a reservation in the Pecos valley near Fort
Sumner. 13
Ignoring a host of cultural barriers, Carleton believed that the
Indians assembled at Bosque Redondo could be persuaded td, give
up their warring ways and settle down as self-supporting yetiman
farmers. His project failed, however, partly because the nu~ber
of Navajos gathered on the reservation far exceeded preliminary';
estimates. Graft and poor planning led to supply problems that
were aggravated by crop failures, disease, and a scarcity of fuel. 14
Navajo livestock also fared poorly. In 1866-67 officials urged the
purchase of additional breeding ewes and raw wool to providejfood
and clothing for the tribe while sheep numbers declined to a paltry
940 head. 15 For the pastoral Navajos, the loss was spiritual as well
as material. As Indian morale plummeted, soaring costs forced
Washington to reevaluate the Bosque experiment.
Attempting a new approach to the nation's Indian troubles, Congress named a seven man "peace commission" in the summer of
1867. Led by Civil War hero Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman,
the commission had a mandate to conciliate several problem tribes
and persuade them to relocate in appropriate areas. When talks
began with Navajo leaders at Fort Sumner in the following May,
the tribal delegation expressed an inflexible determination to return home and live again among the mesas and canons where
Carson's men had captured them. No other proposal was acceptable. 16
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Mter lengthy negotiations, a peace treaty was drawn up and
approved by both sides in a formal ceremony. Despite Sherman's
skepticism, Article II ofthe new agreement granted the Indians'
dearest wish, a reservation in Arizona and New Mexico. The government exacted a heavy price for this concession, however, ceding
only a small part of the lands requested. The secondary treaty terms
were also niggardly. In comparison with other tribes who made
treaties with the peace commission at this time, the Navajos were
shortchanged. Nevertheless, the compact did promise annual distributions of cotton goods, hardware, and other necessities for the
next ten years and subsistence for the coming winter in the form
of 500 beef cattle and 1,000,000 pounds of corn. Most importantly,
Section 2 ofArticle XII reestablished Navajo livestock culture through
purchase of 15,000 head of sheep and goats at a cost not to exceed
$30,000.00,17 Beguiled by this seeming generosity, Navajos could
happily ignore less favorable aspects of the agreement. Tribal
spokesman Barboncito declared himself well pleased and that the
new reservation was "more than we ever expected to get."18 .
With the treaty signed the Navajos wasted no time in leaving
the repressive confines of Bosque Redondo. They quickly gathered
their few possessions, rounded up the remaining livestock, and
began the long homeward trek guarded by a military escort under
Lt. Col. Charles J. Whiting. As the returnees moved west, the
sight of familiar landmarks caused increasing excitement. One
member of the party recalled the surge of emotion near Albuquerque when they caught a first glimpse of Mount Taylor: '''We
wondered if it was our mountain and we felt like talking to the
ground, we loved it so.''' They found the Rio Grande still in flood
stage. from the spring runoff, which caused a delay while rafts were
thrown together to ferry women and children, the sheep, and the
weakest horses across the swollen stream. 19 Continuing west on
the Fort Wingate road, the travelers discovered that the Rio Puerco
was also running bank-full, which forced them to use a toll bridge
that Santiago Hubbell maintained. Determined to take advantage
of this windfall, Hubbell demanded five cents apiece for every
man, woman, and child who crossed his bridge plus fees of twentyfive and ten cents for each horse and sheep. Embarrassed for cash,
Whiting had little to offer the obstinate proprietor except vague
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promises of future payment. Two years later Hubbell's claim that
he was due $959.60 for crossing 7,136 Navajos, 4,190 sheep, 564
horses and 14 wagons remained unpaid, still pending before federal
authorities. 20
Within ten days after crossing the Puerco, the last of the Navajos
arrived at Ojo del Oso, site of recently reactivated Fort Wingate,
where they were permitted to disband and go their own way. On
23 July official responsibility for the tribe passed from military to
civil authorities. Reporting the changeover to his superiors in St.
Louis, Maj. Charles McClure, chief of commissary for the District
of New Mexico, stated that the removal had cost $48,729.80 thus
far. According to McClure, the Indians had behaved well on their
way home and should be rewarded promptly with the rations of
corn and beef that had been promised to them. These supplies
were intended to sustain the returnees until they could plant crops
and reestablish their flocks. He also advised that the sheep pledged
by the government be purchased and distributed at once to supplement those brought back from Bosque Redondo. Already some
Navajos had begun trading horses for sheep with local ranchers
and were asking about the stock due them under Article XII. 21
However, government authorities disregarded this obligation until
after the first of the year.
On 13 January '1869, Charles P. Clever, New Mexico's nonvoting
delegate to Congress, started bureaucratic wheels turning with a
letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Nathaniel G. Taylor. After
reminding Taylor of the government's obligation, Clever urged that
the sheep be secured before March when the lambing season began. Once the ewes had lambs, the price per head would be higher,
and travel would be impossible for several weeks. 'Quick action was
necessary, or the Indians would lose a year's crop of lambs and
wool. 22
Once started through channels, Clever's recommendation received prompt attention. On 25 January, Secretary of the Interior
Orville H. Browning ordered Taylor to instruct New Mexico's Superintendent of Indian Affairs Jose Manuel Gallegos to proceed
with the purchase. 23 Accordingly, the commissioner drew up a fivepage memorandum directed to Gallegos in Santa Fe that set forth
guidelines for buying the sheep. Reflecting the mood in Washing-
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ton, Taylor emphasized that the total cost must not exceed $30,000.00
under any circumstances. He ordered Gallegos to await further
instructions, if that amount was insufficient to secure 15,000 head. 24
About three weeks later Taylor received a discouraging reply in
which Gallegos identified several problems. First, the season was
too far advanced to advertise for bids, which made an open market
purchase the only alternative. Also, a hard winter with heavy death
losses had caused a rising sheep market. Ranchers were asking
$4.25 per head for quality breeding ewes, but Gallegos thought
that some might be secured at $3.50 through sharp trading. That
figure was still well over the $2.00 stipulated in the treaty. As for
the type best suited to Navajo needs, the superintendent advised
that the government stay with the ordinary sheep of the country,
New Mexico churros, which were easier kept than improved breeds
from the East. 25
Back in Washington, Taylor sought an opinion from J. Francisco
Chaves who had recently succeeded Clever as congressional delegate. Chaves's counsel carried weight since he was an experienced
sheepman whose ancestors had for generations ranched and traded
livestock in the Rio Abajo. He quickly confirmed Gallegos's report,
stating that anyone purchasing pregnant ewes in March would have
to pay a 20 or 30 percent premium "for the bellies," the lamb
inside. Furthermore, if the sheep were bought in the spring, they
would require constant attention until July when the new lambs
became strong enough to ford the Rio Grande,and hit the trail for
the Navajo country. Someone would have to pay wages to herders,
shearers, and a lambing crew. To avoid all this extra expense,
Chaves suggested deferring action until August when lambs were
usually weaned and the next year's cycle began anew. 26 Persuaded
by Chaves's arguments, Taylor decided to put the matter aside
until the end of summer. The thankless task of informing the Navajos about the postponement fell to their acting agent, J. Carey
French. 27
During the next months the new administration of President
Ulysses S. Grant made political changes that transferred responsibility for New Mexico Indian affairs to a new set of officials. Grant's
friend and protege Ely S. Parker replaced Taylor as commissioner.
Maj. William Clinton took over from Gallegos as superintendent
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in Santa Fe, and Capt. Frank Tracy Bennett superseded French
at the Navajo agen<;y in Fort Defiance.
Despite the bureaucratic turnover, the sheep purchase was not
forgotten. Soon after assuming his new post, Clinton heard a rumor
through the military grapevine that Vicente Romero, a wealthy
Mora County rancher and politico, had a large number of sheep
for sale at a reasonable price. Seeking more information, the superintendent wrote to Romero at his La Cueva ranch near Fort
Union. Within a few days he received a reply penned in don Vicente's elegant script offering to deliver 2.0,000 to 25,000 head at
$1.50 each. 28 Cheered by Romero's reaction, Clinton hurriedly
informed Washington of the offer and recommended that it be
confirmed at once. Parker was not impressed, however, and sent
back a testy response. Clinton's procedure had been improper;
government regulations required a solicitation· of bids through
newspaper advertisements. 29 As a result, the deal collapsed, which
forced the superintendent to start over.
To comply with Parker's instructions Clinton placed an advertisement 10 September 1869 in the Santa Fe New Me~ican that
solicited sealed proposals from interested parties. His office was
ready to buy 14,000 sheep and 1,000 goats, including 300 rams
and 100 billies, all to be delivered at Fort Defiance. Unfortunately
the advertisement failed to attract much attention. When the bids
were opened at 11:00 A.M. on 1 October, Clinton had received
only three proposals, all much higher than anticipated. Romero
had raised his price to $2.37 for ewes and $5.00 for rams; W. L.
Lewis and Brother submitted the low bid for the goats-$3.15
straight across. By combining the two offers Clinton found that his
$30,000.00 would buy only 11,996 animals, shortchanging the Navajos more than 3,000 head.
Perplexed, he first wired Parker for advice but then resolved
the dilemma by rejecting all bids on his own authority. At the same
time he wrote to three of the great sheep magnates in the Rio
Abajo, Jose Leandro Perea, his brother Jose Ynez Perea, and Mariano Yrissari seeking new offers. 30 Before any more trading took
place, however, Vicente Romero had second thoughts. Fearful that
the contract might elude him, don Vicente sent his son Rafael to
arrange a compromise in Santa Fe. According to local gossip, the
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elder Romero was short on cash following a recent unsuccessful
campaign to unseat J. Francisco Chaves as New Mexico's congressional delegate. Mter a little dickering, Rafael agreed to deliver all
15,000 sheep and goats at Fort Defiance prior to 1 December for
$2.00 each, a figure satisfactory to all concerned. 31
From Washington, Parker rather belatedly approved Clinton's
actions, closing his letter with a reminder that the contracts and
performance bonds must be executed in triplicate with the proper
Internal Revenue stamps affixed for validation. 32 At his end, the
superintendent informed Captain Bennett that the sheep had left
La Cueva and suggested that the agent send out a crew of reliable
Navajos to help Romero's men bring the flock into Fort Defiance.
While the sheep made their way west, Bennett ordered a new
pole corral erected to facilitate the distribution. On 25 November,
the flock's vanguard arrived at the agency, weary and footsore, and
were turned loose for a few days grazing under the watchful eyes
of several thousand Navajos. To make sure that the animals were
divided fairly, Big Belly gave a cardboard ticket to each Indian,
the same system used for issuing corn and beef on ration days.
During the five day allotment, about 250 head were stolen or killed
from over-crowding, but when the dust settled and the last animals
were counted out, 7,470 Navajos had exchanged their tickets for
two head of stock. Later, Bennett reported that the Indians were
so pleased and grateful that many cried out, "Good father, thank
yoU!"33 After completing the issue, the agent drew up a formal
receipt in conformity with governmental legal procedure. As they
had done at Fort Sumner, Manuelito, Barboncito, and the aptly
named Ganado Mucho came forward with nine others to make
their marks and conclude the transaction.
During the year preceding the sheep distribution, the Navajos
had remained quiet and peaceful, working hard to reestablish themselves in their old homeland. They had raised fairly good crops of
wheat and corn in the summer of 1869 but saved little because of
early frosts and poor storage facilities. 34 Lack of grain surpluses
made them almost completely dependent for another year on rations provided by a parsimonious government. In February, a crisis
occurred when Clinton informed Bennett that there were no more
funds to purchase beef cattle for distribution at Fort Defiance. In
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a bitter reply, the agent pointed out the absurdity of forcing the
Navajos to convert into mutton stew the sheep intended to make
them self-sufficient. Curtailed rations would lead inevitably to renewed thievery followed by military repression. That scenario was
sure to be far more expensive than a few thousand pounds of corn
and beef. Fortunately, Indian Office personnel heeded Bennett's
advice and prevented disaster by borrowing supplies from the military commissary at Fort Wingate. 35 When spring arrived the Navajo
again planted their small fields with wheat and corn, hoping to
assure themselves a dependable food supply. The future looked
even brighter at lambing time as large numbers of lambs arrived
to supplement the tribe's flocks.
.
Bad luck continued to dog Navajo farmers, however. After a
severe setback from a May snowstorm, the new crop was almost
completely wiped out by summer drought and early frosts, which
made 1870 more disastrous than the year before. In August, Bennett predicted that once again the tribe would require additional
winter rations. Only 25 percent of the tribe's corn crop would
mature enough to make "roasting ears. "36
Recalled to military service, Big Belly left Fort Defiance within
six months after submitting the above report. His replacement,
Civil War veteran James H. Miller, arrived 3 February 1871 to find
the Navajos in pitiful condition. Some of them were so hungry.that
they attempted to steal agency work oxen for food. As before, the
army came to the rescue and prevented starvation by making a
loan of corn and beef worth $41,744.49. 37 The summer of 1871
brought no improvement. Despite hard work by the Indians the
reservation's harsh environment blocked new attempts to wrest a
living from the soil.
In contrast, the sheep were thriving. According to Col. Nathaniel
Pope, who succeeded Clinton as New Mexico's Indian superintendent, the Navajo flock had increased to 40,000 head in July
1871. Agent Miller, who lived on the reservation, made a more
conservative guess of 30,000, but either estimate shows an impressive gain: More importantly, the expanding inventory indicated
the significance of sheep in tribal culture. Although faced with
recurrent starvation, most Navajos preferred to hunt rabbits and
gophers rather than butcher their breeding stock. 38

Navajo churro sheep. Courtesy of University of New Mexico Library, Special
Collections Department.
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Once established at his new post, Miller soon realized that ending Navajo reliance on government handouts was no easy task.
After assessing the means available to bolster the tribal economy
and achieve greater self-sufficiency, he offered two recommendations. First, he renewed a proposal made earlier by Bennett for
development of the rich farm lands along the San Juan River seventy-five miles northeast of Fort Defiance. Impressed by the valley's moderate elevation, fertile soil, and irrigation potential, Miller
believed the area might become a tribal breadbasket that could
end forever the danger of famine. In recent years the Navajos had
shunned the region because of its proximity to their traditional
enemies, the Utes, but Miller thought that peace could be maintained by constructing a sub-agency at some appropriate point. 39
Second, the agent strongly urged the purchase of additional sheep
as part of the government annuity goods distributed each fall under
the 1868 treaty. Several headmen had already requested such a
substitution for two thirds of the amount due them. Some Indians
were so anxious to acquire more stock that they exchanged their
previous issue of dry goods and hardware to Hispano neighbors at
less than half cash value. From Santa Fe, Superintendent Pope
strongly endorsed Miller's suggestion in his reports to Washington,
. observing "The Navajos are a stock raising people and prize sheep
above anything that is furnished them by the government." :Both
officials agreed that additional sheep would increase supplies of
food and clothing. Pope also hoped that a wool surplus would
encourage Navajo weavers to expand production of their famous
blankets that were always in great demand. 40
While government bureaucrats considered suggestions from Miller
and Pope, reservation crops failed again in the summer of 1871.
After inspecting farmlands at Chinle forty miles northwest of Fort
Defiance in October, Miller reported a disaster there, adding that
the tribe badly needed extra supplies. 41 After the first of the year
he informed Pope that the seed grain Indians retained for spring
planting had been consumed as food. In February, Miller received
20,000 pounds of corn from Fort Wingate, a week's supply, but he
desperately needed 50,000 more. A month later he warned Pope
that ranchers must keep their stock well away from Indian lands.
Grazing too close invited pilfering by hungry Navajos.42 His fears
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proved groundless, however; somehow the tribe survived another
winter without resorting to thievery.
Goaded by Miller's gloomy reports, officials in Washington began
to show an interest in improving Navajo conditions. In May, Com~
missioner Francis A. Walker approved a purchase of additional
sheep and authorized Pope to accept bids for another 10,000 ewes. 43
Early in June the superintendent placed the required advertisements in the New Mexican and Albuquerque's Republican Review,
which announced conditions for the sale. All animals must be two
or three year oIds, free from blemishes, and subject to inspection
by Agent Miller. Delivery would take place at Fort Defiance before
1 September. Bids submitted must have the endorsement of two
responsible parties as guarantors.
When Pope opened the proposals on 25 June, he found that
Bernhard Seligman of Santa Fe was low bidder, offering to provide
the entire lot at $1.92 1/2 per head. 44 One of New Mexico's leading
German-jewish merchants, Seligman and his brothers Sigmund
and Adolph were frequent contenders for military and Indian supply contracts. Pleased with his bargain Pope asked Seligman if he
could provide another 1,500 ewes at the same price, but the trader
quickly declined. Conditions had changed so that he then faced a
loss on the contract. He had planned to buy Chihuahua sheep for
the Navajos, but that scheme had been thwarted by political instability in Mexico following the death of President Benito Juarez
on 18 July. The subsequent turmoil had forced Seligman to purchase higher priced New Mexico stock for delivery at Fort Defiance. 45 Despite this unhappy turn of events the trader fulfilled his
obligation although he had some difficulty in doing so. Arriving a
few days late on 6 September, his first drove numbered only 7,414
head. A month later Seligman's mayordomo turned over to acting
agent Thomas V. Kearn an additional 2,030 ewes, still about 600
head short of the required number. Federal authorities failed to
complain, however, and issued vouchers totaling $18,179.70 to
Seligman's credit. 46
The 25,000 sheep and goats purchased from Romero and Seligman were the only animals procured for the Navajos with government funds, but the Indians found other ways to enlarge their
flocks. Although forbidden to do so they cheerfully traded off sur-
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plus annuity goods at Cubero, Cebolleta, and other nearby Hispanic villages. The pueblo of Jemez was another contact point
where sheep could be bought with horses or blankets. Some tribal
members exchanged weavings for livestock at Mormon settlements. 47 Occasionally a few backsliders reverted to old ways and
used more direct methods to increase their assets. In August 1870,
for example, thieves struck near Los Lunas· in the Rio Abajo, absconding with several hundred sheep belonging to Antonio Luna,
probate judge of Valencia County. Determined to recover his property, Luna rode into Fort Defiance backed up by a posse of fifty
men, all armed to the teeth. The judge· received no satisfaction
from Agent Bennett, however, who refused to arrest the culprits
because they had apologized and promised not to steal again. 48 Six
months later raiders hit again near Pefia Blanca, seizing stock valued at more than $4,000.00 from Tomas C. de Baca and others. In
an angry letter to territorial Governor William A. Pile, C. de ,Baca
complained that, through official lassitude, New Mexico ranchers
had become mere herders for Indian rustlers. 49 Incidents of this
kind were rare, however,· and high ranking military officers dismissed them as inevitable petty thievery, unworthy of much concern. 50
Contemporary documents offer few clues to the importance of
barter and theft in reestablishing Navajo pastoralism after Bosque
Redondo. Even more difficult to estimate is the number of sheep
retained by Indians who avoided capture. One group of fugitives,
led by Hoskinini, kept their flocks intact by taking refuge in the
vast reaches of Monument Valley where they managed to avoid
white contact for many years. According to oral tradition, Hoskinini
anticipated the tribe's reunion and exhorted his people to conserve
their stock so that one day they might help needy friends and
relations start life anew. 51
Although their exact number remains· a mystery, the animals
hidden away by bands such as Hoskinini's must have contributed
to the startling increase in Navajo sheep in official records from
Santa Fe and Fort Defiance. In his annual report for 1872, Super. intendent Pope wrote that the tribe' owned 130,000 head, a jump
of 90,000 to 100,000 from the previous year. Blandly ignoring the
discrepancy, he described the growth as "wonderful" and recom-
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mended that still more animals be issued in the coming fall. 52 How
Pope and other officials compiled their figures is unclear, but certainly no one made a tally of reservation livestock. Indian office
administrators took the superintendent at his word, however, but
declined to approve additional purchases, depending instead on
nature for future expansion.
Subsequent reports indicated continuing growth but at a more
realistic rate-175,000 head in 1873 climbing to 500,000 in 1878.
Five years later sheep and goats together totaled more than 1,000,000
head. As early as 1876 the tribe again was selling large numbers
of blankets and had accumulated 200,000 pounds of marketable
surplus wool. More significant for cost-cutting bureaucrats, the
rejuvenated sheep industry made the Navajos almost self-sufficient
within .a decade after the 1869 issue. In 1876 the tribe received
only 10 percent of its subsistence from government aid, obtaining
the remainder by its own efforts. This ratio represented a big gain
from the previous year when the Navajo had been forced to rely
on federal assistance for 65 percent of their livelihood. 53
Possibly encouraged by Navajo success, the Office of Indian Affairs initiated sheep programs with two other tribes in 1873. One
was intended to help neighboring Hopis who also had suffered a
series of bad harvests because of adverse weather conditions. After
receiving the customary contract, Santa Fe merchant Willi Spiegelberg, a competitor of Seligman's, delivered 2,200 ewes in the
fall to the Hopi villages eighty miles west of Fort Defiance. Subsequent reports show that the ewes formed the nucleus of a moderately successful enterprise, increasing to 10,600 in 1882. The sale
was less fortunate for Spiegelberg who experienced much difficulty
in collecting his money from the federal exchequer. 54 During the
same year, government officials purchased another 800 ewes for
the benefit of the Yankton Sioux who lived far north of New Mexico
in present-day South Dakota. These sheep remained under the
control ofAgent John Gasmann and were not allotted to individuals.
Gasmann established a weaving room einploying six or eight Sioux
women who learned to fabricate woolen textiles such as flannel.
The project reached its peak in 1875 when the apprentices produced cloth enough to provide material for one dress for every
woman in the tribe. The Yankton sheep program did not last long,
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however. Unlike the Navajos, the Sioux failed to make any cultural
identification with sheep raising. By 1880 the flock had been sold
and replaced with beef cattle. 55
Such experiments showed that tribal sheep enterprises did not
always lead to economic prosperity. For the Navajos, however,
sheep raising provided the means of survival for an increasing
population living in a difficult environment. After the return from
Bosque Redondo the industry had been quickly reestablished as
the basis of Navajo economy through government assistance and
individual resourcefulness. In contrast, reservation agriculture remained hazardous during the last decades of the nineteenth. century. Disregarding the Ute menace, Navajo farmers began to develop
irrigated lands along the San Juan, but many years passed before
the valley reached its full potential. Despite a sustained effort the
tribe was unable to produce sufficient grain in good years to store
up surpluses for the bad ones. So pastoralism became the dominant
element of Navajo culture, in which sheep represented the .good
things in life, not only in a material way but also as a source of
personal, family, and tribal well-being.
Unfortunately, Navajo pastoralism was based on the false assumption that there would always be grass available for the tribe's
multiplying flocks. Searching for fresh pasture, some Indians frequently ignored reservation boundaries despite objections .from
agents and military officials. Conflict for range became more. acute
as settlement on nearby public lands increased. Overgrazing on
the reservation, evident as early as 1883, exacerbated the situation.
In 1890, Agent C. E. Vandever complained of roaming Navajos in
his annual report, adding, "Wherever grass grows, there they think
their sheep and horses ought to graze."56 To minimize trespass
difficulties Vandever recommended cession of additional lands to
the Navajos, a suggestion that Washington followed several times.
Despite the enlarged acreage the tribal land base began to deteriorate rapidly. Eventually overgrazing and erosion led to the traumatic stock reduction program of the 1930s and 1940s, a tragic era
in Navajo history. Thus the very success of the restocking measures
that assured survival in the first years after Bosque Redondo also
made future problems inevitable as Navajo flocks continued to
outstrip the carrying capacity of tribal rangelands.
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